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Recent Rather Unrelated (but irresistible) Developments:
Convicted perjurers are now competent to testify in Maryland courts! But the fifteen-year
time limit for impeachment by prior convictions does not apply to convictions for perjury. Rules
Order, Dec. 13, 2016, effective to actions commencing on or after April 1, 2017 (amending Md.
Rule 5-609(b) and conforming to HB 237, ch. 531, MD Laws 2016).
General time limit for impeachment of a witness by his or her prior convictions does not
necessarily preclude questioning of a character witness about the principal witness’s older
convictions. Williams v. State (Md. App., Mar. 30, 2017) (no abuse of discretion in permitting
prosecution to question character witness, who had known defendant for 15 years and testified to
defendant’s peacefulness, about whether knowledge of defendant’s 25-year-old conviction for
battery would affect witness’s testimony).
Restitution for future lost earnings. See In re Cody H. (Md., March 24, 2017).
Witness who took heroin on day of testimony. Cruz v. State (Md. App., Mar. 31, 2017) (no
abuse of discretion in denying motion to strike testimony of witness who testified she had used
$40 worth of heroin on day of trial; burden is on moving party to prove incompetence).
Overview of today’s topics:
Only an out-of-court statement (“OCS”) offered for the truth of the matter that was
being asserted by the out-of-court declarant (“declarant”) at the time when s/he made the
OCS (“TOMA”) = hearsay (“HS”). If evidence is not HS, the HS rule cannot exclude it.
The Confrontation Clause also applies only to HS, but even then, only to its
subcategory comprising “testimonial hearsay.”
Cross-references to “MD-EV” are to section numbers of L. MCLAIN, vols. 5, 6, and
6A of the Maryland Practice Series, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL
(Thomson Reuters 3d ed. 2013 and 2015-2016 pocket parts, which were compiled by Leonard
Stamm, Esq.), which is available hardbound or on Westlaw. The books are most easily found
on Westlaw by searching for “McLain” under “Secondary Sources” in the Maryland database.
They contain much more detail than does vol. 7, which is softbound and provides a short
overview of the Maryland Rules of Evidence.
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An earlier version of the charts in this handout is found in section 800:0 of the treatise.
That version may be accessed on Westlaw by clicking on the PDF icon for each particular chart.
Table of Contents
Chart 1 FLOW CHART FOR HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE ANALYSIS
I.

II.

ADMISSIBILITY OR EXCLUSION UNDER THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE

4

THE EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE EVIDENCE
RULES! BUT DOES THE CONSTITUTION EXCLUDE IT?

5

A.
B.

Confrontation Clause Overview
If the Confrontation Clause Does Not Exclude the Evidence,
Because It is Not Testimonial Hearsay, the Only Remaining
Constitutional Safeguard Is the Due Process Clause

Chart 2 IS THE EVIDENCE AN “OUT- OF- COURT STATEMENT” (“OCS”)
OF A PERSON?
A.
B.
C.

What is a “Statement”?
When is a Statement an “Out-of-Court” Statement?
To Be Covered by the Hearsay Rule, a Statement Must Have
Been Made by “a Person”

Chart 3 IS THE OCS OFFERED FOR “TOMA”?
A.
B.
C.
D.

Hearsay Schemata
TOMA Analysis
Frequently Recurring Categories of Nonhearsay When an OCS is
Relevant Short of Proving TOMA
Evidence Offered for a Nonhearsay Purpose is Not Subject to
the Confrontation Clause: A Critical Threshold Question

Chart 4 THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: IS THE HEARSAY
“TESTIMONIAL?”
I.

4

5

6

7
7
10
11
13
13
14
15
19

20

HEARSAY IS TESTIMONIAL (AND THUS SUBJECT TO THE
RIGHT TO CONFRONT) IF IT IS:

20

A.
B.

20
21

U.S. Supreme Court Cases: Testimonial
Maryland Cases: Testimonial
2

II.

HEARSAY IS NONTESTIMONIAL (AND THUS NOT REACHED
BY THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE) IF IT IS:

25

A.
B.

25
27

U.S. Supreme Court Cases: Nontestimonial
Maryland Cases: Nontestimonial

Chart 5 DID THE ACCUSED “FORFEIT” HIS OR HER CONFRONTATION
RIGHT?

29

Chart 6 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS (CATEGORIES OF HEARSAY THAT
ARE NOT EXCLUDED BY THE HEARSAY RULE)

31

A.
B.

C.

D.

Multiple Hearsay: OCS’S Within OCS’s: Md. Rule 5-805
Hearsay Exceptions that Are Applicable Only if the Declarant
Testifies at Trial and is Subject to Cross-Examination:
Md. Rule 5-802.1
Md. Rule 5-803: Hearsay Exceptions Applicable Regardless Whether
the Declarant is Available or Unavailable to Testify at Trial, and
Regardless Whether the Declarant Testifies or Not
Hearsay Exceptions Applicable Only When the Declarant is Shown,
under Md. Rule 5-804(b), to be Unavailable to Testify

3

31

31

35
42

Chart 1 FLOW CHART FOR HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION
I.

ADMISSIBILITY OR EXCLUSION UNDER THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
No (either not an OCS or not by a
person): not HS (Md. Rule 5-801).
See Chart 2, pp. 7-13 below.

IS AN OCS OF A PERSON BEING
PROVED?

Yes (then it might be HS evidence (EVI)). The person
who made the OCS is the Out-of-Court Declarant.
Even a witness on the stand is an Out-of-Court
Declarant if she is testifying to her own OCS.

FOR WHAT PURPOSE IS THE
PROPONENT OF THE EVI OFFERING
IT? IS THAT PURPOSE RELEVANT?

No (inadmissible: Md. Rule 5-402).

Yes
In order for the EVI offered to help (at all) to prove or
disprove the relevant fact as to which it is offered, must the
fact-finder rely on the TOMA, the truthfulness/accuracy of a
fact that was asserted (earlier) by the out-of-court declarant?

No: Not HS; the HS Rule
does not exclude the EVI.
See Chart 3, pp. 13-20
below.

Yes (HS)
(HS) an exception to the hearsay rule
Does the EVI fall within
(Md. Rules 5-802.1, 5-803, & 5-804)? Have all of the
foundation elements for that exception been proved to the
judge’s satisfaction by a preponderance of the evidence
[Md. Rule 5-104(a)]? See Chart 6, pp. 31-44 below.

Yes: The HS rule does not exclude the EVI.
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No (inadmissible HS:
Md. Rule 5-802).

Yes: inadmissible under another rule (e.g., Md.
Rules 5-404 through 5-412) or a privilege. If,
for example, the OCS was made in a
compromise negotiation, Md. Rule 5-408
excludes it.

Does any other specific rule of
evidence, or privilege, exclude the EVI?

No

Should the court exercise its discretion to
exclude the EVI under Md. Rule 5-403?

Yes: Inadmissible because of substantial risk of
unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. See
MD-EV 403:1—403:10.

No
II.

THE EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE EVIDENCE RULES! BUT
DOES THE CONSTITUTION EXCLUDE IT? See MD-EV 800:1—800:21.
A.

Confrontation Clause Overview
No: Confron. Cl. does not exclude it.
E.g., Blanks v. State, 228 Md. App.
335 (2016) (D. Eyler, J.) (due process,
see pp. 6-7 below, but not
confrontation clause, applies to
probation revocation hearing).

Is the EVI being offered (1) against a
criminal accused (including an
alleged juvenile delinquent) AND (2)
at a trial on the merits?

Yes
No: Confron. Cl. does not exclude it. Davis
v. Washington, 554 U.S. 353 (2006).

Is the EVI “testimonial hearsay”?
See Chart 4, pp. 20-30 below.

Yes
Yes: Confron. Cl. does not exclude it. Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Lawson v
State, 389 Md. 570 (2005).
As to the trial court's ability to limit cross-exam,
see, e.g., Peterson v. State, 444 Md. 105 (2015).

Is the HS Declarant present and
subject to cross-exam?
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No

Is the declarant unavailable to testify (Md.
Rule 5-804(a)?

No: Confron. Cl. excludes EVI unless
accused forfeited confron. right. See Chart 5,
pp. 29-30 below.

Yes

Did the accused have an earlier
opportunity to cross-examine the
Declarant about the OCS?

Yes: Confron. Cl. does not exclude EVI.

No

EVI is excluded unless accused FORFEITED
confron. right (see Chart 5, pp. 29-30 below), or
OCS was a dying declaration (see Chart 4, at p.
25 below).

B.

If the Confrontation Clause Does Not Exclude the Evidence Because It is Not
Testimonial Hearsay, the Only Remaining Constitutional Safeguard Is the Due
Process Clause. See MD-EV 800:20.

Due process requires that a verdict not be based on unreliable hearsay.
Lower appellate courts have therefore continued to apply Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US.56 (1980) to
evaluate the fact-finder’s reliance on nontestimonial hearsay. Dictum in Michigan v. Bryant, 562
U.S. 344 (2011), supports this position.
Under Roberts, there is no error if the nontestimonial hearsay relied upon at trial either:
(1) Qualifies under a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception (probably all those listed in Title 5,
except statements against penal interest, Md. Rule 5-804(b)(3)); or
6

(2) Is shown to have had equivalent “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”
Current Maryland case law sometimes adds the requirement that “‘there is good cause for
[the hearsay’s] admission.’” See Blanks v. State, 228 Md. App. 335 (2016) (D. Eyler, J.)
(aff’g Brett W. Wilson, J., Dorchester County, who in probation revocation hearing – a
civil proceeding – had permitted probation agent to testify to collection of probationer’s
urine sample, and California lab supervisor to testify to presence of marijuana in that
urine sample; Court of Special Appeals held that probationer’s due process right to
confront was satisfied).
The test results in Blanks qualified as business records, and the witnesses’ testimony
established their reliability. Because the results met the Roberts reliability test, there was
no need to also show good cause for their admission. In any event, however, good cause
was shown, as it would be “‘highly impractical’” to require the State to call every
technician who had participated in the assembly-line approach to testing the sample.
Chart 2 IS THE EVIDENCE AN “OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENT” (“OCS”) OF A
PERSON? (see MD-EV 801:2—801:6)
A.

What is a “Statement”?
1.

Md. Rule 5-801(a) defines a “statement” as either “(1) an oral or written assertion
or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an
assertion.”
“Statement” means an assertion of one or more facts or opinions. A statement
may be either an oral assertion, a written assertion (e.g., note or document), or
conduct intended as an assertion.

2.

The statement is usually “verbal” (i.e., in words, no matter whether written or
oral).

3.

A “statement” also may be nonverbal assertive conduct” clearly intended by
the actor as a substitute for particular words (e.g., nodding head to say “yes”
or “no,” pointing to a person in a line-up when asked, “Do you see the person who
attacked you?,” raising hand to indicate affirmative answer when asked, “who
would like to volunteer …?”).

4.

“Statement does not include implied assertions from nonverbal nonassertive
conduct (e.g., walking down the street, putting a heavy coat on, raising an
umbrella, even if offered to show that the person could walk, that it was cold out,
or that it was raining). See MD-EV 801:5.
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5.

“Statement” may, however, include an implied assertion from an utterance in
words (but only if the utterance is offered to prove the truth of the implied
assertion and has no independent relevance as circumstantial, nonhearsay
evidence. See MD-EV 801:6.
a.

Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681 (2005) (Raker, J.) (“Is Erik going to get
me?” was hearsay, because it was relevant only if taken to mean “…like he
got [killed] Calen?”).

b.

Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1 (2005) (Raker, J.) (hospital bill found in
residence where defendant and illegal drugs were found, and addressed to
defendant at that address, was inadmissible hearsay when the prosecutor
argued in closing that the hospital would want to be sure it had the right
address so it could be paid).
Judge Greene had held, while on the Court of Special Appeals, that the
evidence was admissible nonhearsay. Judges Wilner and Battaglia,
dissenting from Judge Raker’s opinion, agreed with Judge Greene.
The dissent would have followed those cases that hold that a name and
address on a piece of mail are not intended by the writer “as an assertion,”
or “not intended to communicate the thought that the [named person] lived
there,” and thus do not constitute hearsay. Such evidence, rather, is
properly admissible “as circumstantial evidence [making it even slightly
more likely than it would be without that evidence] that [the defendant]
stored his property, including his correspondence,” in the place where it was
found, which in turn tends to prove that the defendant exercises control over
that place. If offered only for that purpose, Bernadyn should not exclude it.

c.

Fields v. State, 168 Md. App. 22 (2006) (D. Eyler, J.) (evidence that the
name “Sat Dogg” was displayed on a screen at a bowling alley was properly
admitted as nonassertive, circumstantial, nonhearsay evidence that
someone by that name was there), aff’d on other grounds, 395 Md. 758
(2006) (Raker, J.).

d.

In a 5 to 2 vote in Garner v. State, 414 Md. 372 (2010) (Murphy, J.) the
Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not erred in permitting a police
officer to testify that he answered the cell phone confiscated from the
defendant during his arrest, said “hello,” and “a male voice” said, “Yo, can I
get a 40.” The evidence was nonhearsay.
Judge Murphy, writing for the majority, reasoned that (1) “[w]hen a
telephone is used to receive illegal wagers or to receive orders called in by
persons who wish to purchase a controlled dangerous substance, the
telephone becomes an instrumentality of the crime”; and (2) “the rule
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against hearsay does not operate to exclude evidence of the ‘verbal act’ that
established a consequential fact: Petitioner was in possession of a telephone
called by a person who requested to purchase cocaine.”
The result of admissibility reached by this decision conformed to the results
obtained for decades in the Court of Special Appeals and around the country
as to similar evidence of telephone calls placing bets or requesting drugs.
The “verbal act” rationale would differentiate the bookie-betting parlor and
drug order cases like Garner from cases like Stoddard and Bernadyn. But
Garner may indicate a partial retreat from the Stoddard majority’s
approach.
The Garner majority could have affirmed under the facts there by looking at
the evidence as nonassertive, circumstantial, nonhearsay evidence that a
phone connected with the defendant received such a call, which was
relevant even if the caller did not have any apparent intention to
communicate to the person who answered the phone the fact that the
defendant sold cocaine. This would be consistent with Judge Wilner’s
concurrence joined by Judges Greene and Battaglia in Stoddard, p. 8 above.
If the Garner majority opinion is read as following this approach, then the
evidence in Fields also was not hearsay; nor would the evidence in
Bernadyn have been hearsay if offered for the proper, relevant, limited
purpose that something with the defendant’s name on it was found at the
address where the drugs were found.
Interestingly, the Garner majority stated: “We need not either reaffirm or
overrule either of those fact-specific cases in [Stoddard or Bernadyn] in
order to hold that the rule against hearsay was not violated by Trooper
Gussoni’s testimony about the telephone call at issue [in Garner].” Judges
Battaglia and Greene were in the majority in Garner, and were joined by
three judges who joined the court after Stoddard, Bernadyn, and Fields:
Judges Adkins, Barbera, and Murphy. Chief Judge Bell and Judge Harrell,
the only two remaining on the Court of Appeals who were in the majority in
Stoddard, found themselves alone in the dissent in Garner.
e.

Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 224-25 (2010) (Thieme, J.) (numbers
shown on cell phone as to missed and received calls were not statements of
a person; even if they had been, their relevance did not depend upon the
belief or accuracy of the person(s) who made the calls, and the testimony of
police detective to the numbers he saw was not hearsay).

f.

In Fair v. State, 198 Md. App. 1 (2011) (Kenney, J.), a paycheck with the
defendant’s name on it, with a pay date of the day before a police officer
testified he found the paycheck in a car console with a handgun and
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underneath a bag of marijuana, was held to have been properly admitted by
the trial court “to show the Defendant’s possessory interest in the
vehicle’….”
Relying on Garner, as well as several federal cases (including a U.S.
Supreme Court decision) holding that paychecks and money orders were not
factual assertions, the Court of Special Appeals held that the paycheck was
a nonhearsay verbal act, relevant and offered as “merely circumstantial
nonassertive crime scene evidence.”
The latter part of the rationale is more intellectually appealing here, because
the fact that the paycheck bore the defendant’s name and was found in the
vehicle linked someone with that name to the vehicle, and it was offered for
that limited purpose, rather than to show that the payor owed or had paid a
certain sum. If it had been offered as to the latter purpose, and that fact had
been relevant, it would have been relevant as a nonhearsay “verbal act.”
B.

When is a Statement an “Out-of-Court” Statement? See MD-EV 801:2.
1.

Md. Rule 5-801(c) defines an out-of-court statement (“OCS”) as “a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing ….”

2.

“Out-of-court” thus means that the evidence offered today at trial is of a
statement made by any person somewhere else at another time. The other
place may even have been another court proceeding.

3.

It is still “out-of-court” EVEN IF THE DECLARANT IS AT TRIAL
TESTIFYING TO HIS OR HER OWN EARLIER STATEMENT. Some
hearsay exceptions even require that the declarant also testify at trial, see Md.
Rule 5-802.1: certain of the declarant-witness’s prior inconsistent or consistent
statements, the declarant-witness’s prior identification of a person, the declarantwitness’s prompt report of sexual assault, and the declarant-witness’s recorded
recollection. These hearsay exception rules would be unnecessary if the fact that
the declarant is testifying at trial made his or her out-of-court statements
nonhearsay.

4.

Why the strong preference for live testimony rather than out-of-court statements,
even of a declarant who is now on the stand?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Better evaluation of demeanor evidence as the witness is testifying to the
underlying facts, rather than reciting a statement;
Better ability to cross-examine live memory;
Out-of-court statement may not have been under oath;
Much time is saved and undue emphasis avoided, if live memory serves, so
there is no need to prove prior consistent statements; and
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e.

C.

Removal of an incentive for the unethical manufacture of perfectly scripted
out-of-court statements.

To Be Covered by the Hearsay Rule, a Statement Must Have Been Made by “a
Person” (see MD-EV 801:3)
1.

Md. Rule 5-801 defines a “statement” as having been by “a person.” It does not
include “statements” by animals – such as a talking parrot, a crowing rooster, or
a barking dog – or “statements” by machines, because neither can be crossexamined.
Rules other than the hearsay rule require a showing of relevance and reliability,
such as foundation evidence regarding the training of the dog, or the routine
maintenance of the machines – or the soundness of the principles they apply. Cf.
In re A.N., 226 Md. App. 283 (2015) (reliance on mother’s polygraph results was
reversible error).

2.

Numbers Shown on Cell Phone for Incoming Calls was Nonhearsay.
Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 224-25 (2010) (Thieme, J.) (numbers
shown on cell phone designating missed and received calls were not assertions or
statements of a person; additionally, their relevance did not depend upon the
belief or accuracy of the person(s) who made the calls, and the testimony of the
police detective to the numbers he saw was not hearsay).

3.

Whether the Statement is By a Person is a Critical Issue in the Confrontation
Clause Context
See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007) (Niemeyer,
J.) (20 pages of data generated by Armed Forces Institute’s Forensic Toxicology
Laboratory chromatograph machine and computers, showing that the
defendant’s blood sample contained ethanol and phencyclidine, were
nonhearsay, because the machine performing chromatography on the
defendant’s blood was not a “person” and could not be a “declarant” under Fed.
R. Evid. 801), cert. denied (U.S. 2009); United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359,
361-62 (7th Cir. 2008) (instruments’ readings were not statements, though
expert’s conclusions based on them were), cert. denied (U.S. 2008); United
States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 193, 202 (4th Cir. 2011) (Washington still good law
after Bullcoming, see p. 21 below).
The facts of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, p. 21 below, did not directly raise
this question, because there the evidence was not a machine printout but a
certificate by a person, based on the machine readings. The same was true in Derr
v. State, I and II, pp. 23-24 below.
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Note the critical difference between a machine printout of instruments’
readings, as opposed to a machine printout of data input by a person. For the
latter to be admissible for its truth, a hearsay exception, such as for business
records, will be needed if the statement is offered for its truth.
In her thoughtful opinion in Baker v. State, 223 Md. App. 750 (2015), Judge
Graeff stated for the Court:
[T]he better reasoned view is that computer-generated records [such as
cell phone call records] generally do not constitute hearsay. When records
are entirely self-generated by the internal operations of the computer, they
do not implicate the hearsay rule because they do not constitute a
statement of a “person.” In that situation, the admissibility of such
“‘should be determined on the basis of the reliability and accuracy of the
process’ used to create and obtain the data.’”
***
Courts have made a distinction between computer-generated records,
where the data is generated by the internal operations of the computer
itself, and computer-stored [such as text messages] records, which reflect
human input. (Emphasis added.)
The Baker court accordingly held that, because it was “likely that the assertion in
the computer records that the phone number that called the victim was appellant's
number was an assertion made by a person,” it could not affirm their admission
on the ground that they were nonhearsay. Because the State failed to have the
records certified as business records, or have the foundation for their qualification
as business records proved by testimony of their custodian, their admission was
error. (On the somewhat related issue of the need for an expert to testify to the
significance of a cell phone call’s being relayed from a particular tower, see State
v. Payne, 440 Md. 680 (2014).)
In a case very similar to Washington, United States v. Drayton, 2014 WL
2919792 (D. Md. 2014) (Grimm, J.), aff’d, 589 Fed. Appx. 153 (4th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 101 (U.S. 2015), the blood of a defendant
driving erratically on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway was tested by the D.C.
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. The court affirmed the magistrate judge's
admission, in a bench trial, of the lab’s Deputy Chief Toxicologist’s testimony
(without the testimony of the technicians who ran the tests) to his conclusion,
based on “‘the raw data that was generated’” by the chromatograph, as to the
concentrations of alcohol and PCP in the defendant’s blood. Under Washington,
that machine-generated raw data was not hearsay.
As Judge Grimm pointed out in Drayton, “Given the fractured nature of Williams
[v. Illinois, see p. 23 below], its limited precedential value, and most critically, the
fact that it seems to approve of the admissibility of the evidence in Washington
12

(p. 11 above) and Summers (pp. 11 above and 23 below), the Supreme Court
cannot be said to have overruled those cases.” Drayton at fn. 6. Nor was the
packet containing that data ever admitted into evidence, so that Fed. R. Evid. 703
(corollary to Md. Rule 5-703) applied.
The prosecution had failed to provide a witness who could authenticate that the
tested blood was the defendant’s, but the defense had failed to preserve that
ground for objection.
Compare with this well-reasoned Fourth Circuit line of cases the less
intellectually satisfying, strained rationale of United States v. Brooks, 715 F.3d
1069, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming admission of computer printouts of data
generated by GPS tracking device hidden in packet of bank currency as
nontestimonial business records generated for “the purpose of locating a robber
and recovering stolen money” rather than “‘for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact at trial’”).
The recent Maryland case, Gross v. State, 229 Md. App. 24 (2016) (Woodward,
J.), addressed the lack of need for an expert to testify as to GPS data in records
generated from the GPS on a stolen box truck, but did not address the hearsay or
confrontation issue. The best analysis would be that they were machine-generated
nonhearsay; but if found to be hearsay, they would have been nontestimonial
business records, as they were routinely generated by the truck's movements, not
for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal
conduct.
Chart 3 IS THE OCS OFFERED FOR “TOMA”?
A.

Hearsay Schemata
(1) What is the evidence offered? Does it include an OCS of a person? (The
evidence may be more than the OCS itself, e.g., it may include to whom and under
what circumstances an OCS was made.) (2) If so, how is the evidence relevant to
the proponent's case: what is it offered to help to prove? (3) Finally, how does the
evidence help to prove that fact? Does the OCS only have probative value as to
that fact if an assertion by the declarant, when making the OCS, was
true/factually accurate?

(1) EVI offered (determined to
include an OCS OF A PERSON)

1.

(2) MATERIAL FACT
that EVI #(1) is offered
to help to prove

(3) Is the OCS offered for

“TOMA”?

If the evidence offered includes an “OCS” of a person, it is hearsay only if it
is offered at trial to prove “TOMA.”
13

2.

TOMA = the truth of any fact that was being asserted by the declarant, AT
THE EARLIER TIME when the declarant made the out-of-court statement.

When the OCS is offered for TOMA, all four hearsay dangers are potentially present:
perception (did the declarant know what he was talking about?); memory (had the
declarant forgotten before making the OCS?); sincerity (did the declarant have reason
to lie? or was her statement intended in jest?); and narration/ambiguity (did the
declarant mean what the words reported to have been uttered seem to mean?)
B.

TOMA Analysis (see MD-EV 801:7)
The OCS is offered for TOMA if the proponent is asking the jury to rely on, as
true, accurate, or correct, something the declarant asserted in his/her OCS.
The step-by-step analysis:
1.

Who was the out-of-court declarant?

2.

What was the declarant asserting at the time s/he made the OCS?

3.

For what purpose, to help to prove what relevant fact, is the proponent
offering the evidence at trial?

4.

HOW DOES THE EVIDENCE TEND TO PROVE THAT FACT?
Md. Rule 5-401 relevance requires only the slightest probative value, not even
necessarily persuasive probative value. See MD-EV 401:1.

5.

If the evidence offered simply HELPS (even a little) TO PROVE the fact as to
which it is offered, even if the out-of-court declarant was either insincere or
inaccurate, the evidence is NOT HEARSAY.
Ask, “Even if the assertions made in the OCS were incorrect, is it still relevant
that the declarant made the statement?” If the answer to this question is yes,
then the evidence is nonhearsay.
The evidence may come in for the relevant nonhearsay purpose (subject to
exclusion under Md. Rule 5-403). A limiting instruction should be given
upon request (Md. Rule 5-105). As to Md. Rule 5-403:
See Graves v. State, 334 Md. 30 (1994) (reversible error to admit arrestee’s
hearsay statement to police that defendant was his accomplice, for nonhearsay
purpose of showing why police included defendant’s picture in photographic
array to be shown to victim: limited probative value for that purpose was
substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice);
14

Sanders v. State, 194 Md. App. 162, 179-87 (2010) (no abuse of discretion in
excluding fact that defendant made a post-Miranda statement to police when
offered by defense for nonhearsay purpose, as it “likely would have confused the
jury and caused it to speculate why the statement was not introduced into
evidence”), vacated on other grounds, 418 Md. 368 (2011).
C.

Frequently Recurring Categories of Nonhearsay When an OCS is Relevant Short of
Helping to Prove TOMA
1.

Sometimes THE MERE FACT THAT THE OCS WAS MADE HAS
RELEVANCE, regardless of whether the declarant was either sincere or
accurate. In this event, the question is simply whether the OCS was made as
testified to; because a person testifying to the OCS can be fully cross-examined as
to whether the OCS was made as s/he has testified, there is no need for the
hearsay rule to apply. The witness on the stand can be cross-examined as to
faulty perception or memory or impeached as to credibility for truthfulness.
a.

VERBAL ACTS (a/k/a “legally operative facts”): the substantive law
regarding the particular type of claim or defense either requires that an
out-of-court statement have been made, e.g., defamation, contracts
(including the offer and the acceptance), wills; or gives a particular legal
effect to that type of statement (e.g., “Your money or your life!”). See
MD-EV 801:8-801:9.
These utterances are “magic words” under the substantive law; they
automatically take the speaker to a particular legal destination, without the
need to inquire into the declarant's sincerity or accuracy. See Garner v.
State (caller’s utterance, “Yo, can I get a 40?”) and Fair v. State (paycheck),
pp. 8-10 above.
See Foster v. University of Maryland Eastern Shore, 908 F. Supp. 2d 686,
691-92 (D. Md. 2012) (Grimm, J.) (statement that constituted part of alleged
harassment), on reconsideration, 2013 WL 5487813 (D. Md. 2013)
(granting defense motion for summary judgment on Title VII claim), rev’d
on other grounds, 787 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015);
Windsor v. State, 2016 WL 4076198 (Md. App. 2016) (unreported)
(Thieme, J.) (initialed note, “acquired eight tools, amount owed $120,”
found in partially filled Oxycodone bottle in defendant's car, was a verbal
act, a promissory note, and admissible nonhearsay, helping to prove that
defendant’s possession of the drug was commercial; alternate holding,
admissible under Md. Rule 5-703 as part of basis of expert’s opinion);
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Johnson v. State, 228 Md. 27 (2016) (Woodward, J.) (in prosecution for
harassment by electronic mail, the harassing emails, sufficiently
authenticated by circumstantial evidence linking them to defendant).
b.

STATEMENTS OFFERED TO PROVE THEIR EFFECT ON THE
HEARER OR READER, to prove that the hearer or reader was put on
notice, or affecting the reasonableness of the hearer’s or reader’s subsequent
conduct, e.g., “Be careful, the floor is wet,” or, in a negligent hiring or
retention case, what the employer had been told about the employee. See
MD-EV 801:10.
E.g., Foster v. University of Maryland Eastern Shore, 908 F. Supp. 2d at
691-92 (D. Md. 2012), p. 15 above (co-worker’s offensive statements to
plaintiff, her responses telling him she wanted no part of his behavior, and
her complaints to human resources and public safety officers were all
admissible nonhearsay, to show their effect on the listeners);
Jarrett v. State, 220 Md. App. 571, 579-83 (2014) (Berger, J.) (in
defendant’s prosecution for murder of his wife, son’s comments to father in
recorded telephone call were properly admitted to show their putting him on
notice of son’s intent to cremate his mother’s remains, which was relevant
when defense argued that it had not had opportunity to examine remains);
Harris v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 227 Md. App. 617, 644 n. 15
(2016) (housing authority’s employees’ statements to affiant that they could
not recall was relevant, not to show that they did not recall, but merely for
nonhearsay purpose to show affiant’s difficulty in finding information);
Wagner v. State, 213 Md. App. 419, 471 (2013) (Graeff, J.) (witness’s
statement that he could not read or write, made to police detective, was
properly admitted to show why detective had not required witness to write
on back of photo witness had identified, when detective had required
another witness to do so).
Rehabilitation of an Impeached Witness by Evidence of Threats He Had
Received:
Armstead v. State, 195 Md. App. 599 (2010) (Kenney, J.) (no error in
admitting State’s witness’s testimony that he was scared and that his
life had been threatened, when witness was nervous and made
inconsistent statements, and court had given limiting instructions that
evidence was relevant only to witness’s credibility and that there was
no evidence that defendant was involved in or knew of the threats),
cert. denied, 418 Md. 191 (2011).
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EXCLUSION UNDER MD. RULE 5-403: Statements offered to prove why
the police took certain actions are relevant for the effect on the hearer,
but are often excluded under Md. Rule 5-403 when offered for this
limited purpose, due to the risk that the jury will consider them for
their truth. See Graves v. State, p. 14 above.
Morris v. State, 418 Md. 194 (2011) (Harrell, J.) reaffirms this general
principle, but found no error under the facts there when the detective
did not repeat the OCS, but testified that, based on the victim’s,
another officer’s, and codefendant’s statements, he retrieved certain
items as associated with the alleged robbery.
c.

STATEMENTS THAT ARE OFFERED AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE TO PROVE ONLY SUCH MATTERS AS THE
DECLARANT’S BEING ALIVE, CONSCIOUS (which may be relevant,
e.g., to pain and suffering), ABLE TO SPEAK A PARTICULAR
LANGUAGE, ETC., AT THE TIME S/HE MADE THE OCS. See MDEV 801:12. Here it doesn’t matter what the declarant said, only that she
said something.

d.

PRIOR STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DECLARANT, THAT ARE
OFFERED ONLY TO IMPEACH OR REHABILITATE THE
DECLARANT’S CREDIBILITY, but not as substantive evidence. See
MD-EV 801:13.
i.

Prior inconsistent statements made by the person who is sought to
be impeached (Md. Rules 5-613, witnesses, and 5-806, nontestifying
hearsay declarants).
See Handy v. State, 201 Md. App. 521 (2011) (Sharer, J.) (defendant’s
OCS, recounting a witness’s OCS, was properly admitted: defendant’s
as a statement of a party opponent, and the witness’s OCS within it
was admitted only to impeach witness with witness’s own statement).
A party can impeach a witness or declarant with that witness’s or
declarant’s own prior inconsistent statements. But a party cannot
impeach one witness with someone else’s out-of-court statement; to do
that would be to offer the non-witness’s statement for its truth, which
is a hearsay purpose.
Sweetney v. State, 423 Md. 610 (2011) (Murphy, J.) (trial court
properly precluded cross-examination of police officer-witness with
out-of-court statement made by another officer in the same
department, regarding search warrant “return” which did not list item
that witness testified was found).
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As to Md. Rule 5-806, cf. Taylor v. State, 407 Md. 137 (2009)
(impeachment of a key, non-testifying declarant – whose OCS has
been admitted for its TOMA – by extrinsic evidence of a prior bad act
under Md. Rule 5-608(b) must be allowed, if it would have been
permitted if the declarant had testified at trial).
ii.

Under certain circumstances the credibility of a witness or out-ofcourt declarant may be rehabilitated by proof that that person’s
prior statements were consistent with his trial testimony. Md. Rule
5-616(c)(2). OCS is to be offered for a limited purpose under Md.
Rule 5-105 and is subject to possible exclusion under Md. Rule 5-403.
See Holmes v. State, 350 Md. 412 (1998) (Chasanow, J.) (use for this
purpose may be permitted when substantive use under Md. Rule 5802.1(c), see p. 32 below, is not).

2.

STATEMENTS THAT DEPEND, FOR THEIR RELEVANCE, ON THE
DECLARANT’S HAVING BEEN SINCERE, BUT NOT ON HIS/HER
HAVING BEEN FACTUALLY ACCURATE, ARE ALSO NOT OFFERED
FOR TOMA. Here the OCS is offered for a nonhearsay purpose, as
circumstantial evidence to prove the declarant’s emotion, state of mind,
knowledge, belief, intent, sanity, affection, ill will, etc., when it is a relevant
issue in the case. The OCS is not a direct assertion by the declarant of his state
of mind. See MD-EV 801:11.
See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 397 Md. 557, 575-80 (2007) (Raker, J.) (evidence of
defendant’s initial refusal to provide a blood sample was properly admitted as
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt, as State had laid proper
foundation by showing that defendant was told blood was needed in reference to
the victim’s health); Holland v. State, 122 Md. App. 532 (1998) (Moylan, J.).
Examples:
(1) In A’s trial for murder of B, the State offers, as relevant to A’s motive or
intent, C’s testimony that A said to C a week before the murder, “B is a mean,
nasty, rotten so-and-so.”
How is this evidence relevant to the State’s case? Is it relevant only if A was
correct as to the facts A asserted, i.e., that B was really mean, nasty, etc.?
No. It will be probative of A’s motive or intent simply if the declarant A believed
that the fact he asserted was true: here, that B was nasty, etc., even if A was
inaccurate, and mistaken about B. The evidence may be properly admitted for a
limited, nonhearsay purpose, as circumstantial evidence that A disliked or thought
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ill of B, which is relevant to A’s motive and intent. The evidence would help to
prove the fact it is offered at trial to prove, even if A was factually wrong, and
B was really a kind and lovely person.
Now assume instead that the State calls C to testify to A’s OCS one week before
the murder, “I hate B.” This OCS is a direct assertion by A of A’s state of mind,
and is offered to prove that A was accurate, i.e., did have the state of mind, i.e.,
A hated B. This OCS is offered to prove TOMA and is hearsay, so it must fall
within a hearsay exception in order for the hearsay rule not to exclude it. (Here it
will qualify under the state of mind hearsay exception, Md. Rule 5-803(b)(3).)
(2) In a CINA case, suppose that the social worker wishes to testify that the
child's father told her, “[Eight-year-old child] is a crybaby. I knew [my
girlfriend’s 12-year-old daughter] was beating on him. But I didn't feel like being
bothered with him. I went out to have a smoke.” Would all or part of this be
relevant only for TOMA? If for TOMA, which hearsay exception(s) would
apply?
D.

Evidence Offered for a Nonhearsay Purpose is Not Subject to the Confrontation
Clause: An Important Threshold Question Not to Be Overlooked (see MD-EV
800:7 and 801:7—801:14)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“The Clause…does not bar the
use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted.”); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (defendant’s rights under the
confrontation clause were not violated by the introduction of the confession of an
accomplice for the nonhearsay purpose of rebutting respondent’s testimony that his
own confession was coercively derived from the accomplice’s statement). See
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227-78 (U.S. 2012) (four justices of a plurality of
five held that Cellmark DNA report that was part of basis of testifying expert’s opinion,
under equivalent of Md. Rule 5-703, was admitted as nonhearsay, under Illinois law).
Hypo: Juvenile is charged with assault and burglary for allegedly breaking into home
where teenaged mother [A.R.] of his child lived with her parents and punching A.R. in
the face. Juvenile’s defense is that the door was open and that A.R. fabricated her
testimony because he wanted to get custody of their child.
Defense counsel proffers that Juvenile wishes to testify that, when he entered the home,
he told A.R.: “I’m tired of all your mess. I’ve hired a lawyer. We’re going to take you
to court and say you are unfit. I have all your text messages, and I am going to get the
baby.” At this point, A.R. said, “I’m going to get your ass in jail. You will never get
[the baby.]”
Is any of this evidence nonhearsay? Hearsay? If hearsay, does it fall under any hearsay
exception? Does the confrontation clause apply to it?
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See Redfearn v. State, 212 Md. App. 785 (2013) (unreported) Sept. Term, 2012,
no. 1379), cert. denied, 434 Md. 314 (2013).
Chart 4 THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: IS THE HEARSAY “TESTIMONIAL?”
See MD-EV 800:10—800:19.
Text of U.S. Constitution, amend. VI: An accused has the right to confront “the
witness” against him or her. In pari materia, Md. Decl. of Rights art. 21.
I. HEARSAY IS TESTIMONIAL (AND THUS SUBJECT TO THE RIGHT TO
CONFRONT) IF IT IS:
A.

U.S. Supreme Court Cases: Testimonial Hearsay
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing; or
A plea allocution; or
Grand jury testimony; or
Prior trial testimony; or
“Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations…”
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
In Crawford, the testimonial statements were made during a “structured,
recorded” interrogation at the police station, when the declarant and her
husband were suspected of having committed an assault.
Crawford focused on the historical context of the Sixth Amendment: antipathy
toward Queen “Bloody Mary’s” government’s gathering of formal, solemn, ex
parte statements to be used in criminal prosecutions.

(6) Police “interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime,
in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict), the perpetrator. The
product of such interrogations, whether reduced to a writing signed by the
declarant or embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the
interrogating officer, is testimonial.” Davis v. Washington, 554 U.S. 353
(2006).
Both an affidavit signed by a domestic violence (DV) victim and her oral
statements to police at the marital home, where her husband, Mr. Hammon, was in
another room, with another officer, were testimonial. Davis’s companion case,
Hammon v. Indiana, 554 U.S. 353 (2006). (J. Thomas dissented as to Hammon
facts.)
The Davis/Hammon Court looked at (1) the “primary motive” (viewed
“objectively”) of the police or the police agent, in asking the particular
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questions: was it to resolve an ongoing emergency (yielding nontestimonial
statements) or to help to prove past criminal conduct/agency “some time
after the events described were over” (yielding testimonial statements)? and
(2) the relative degree of solemnity and formality of the interrogation. Both of
these factors were held to be relevant to what an objective declarant would take to
be the primary purpose of his or her statements.
Dictum: “volunteered testimony” in absence of interrogation would still be
testimonial.
(7)

Notarized certificates by analysts of “a state laboratory required by law to
conduct chemical analysis upon police request” that a seized substance was
cocaine and how much it weighed.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (5 to 4 decision: dissent by
Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Breyer and Alito, JJ.).
But dictum: “notice and demand” statutes are constitutional. Note: The State
must provide notice, e.g., under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 10-1001
through 10-1003, of a state chemist’s report regarding a controlled substance
before each trial, including retrials, even where the defense had cross-examined
the expert at the first trial. Harrod v. State, 423 Md. 24 (2011).

(8)

B.

In a case like #7, the witness subject to cross must be either the person who
performed or who witnessed the tests. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647
(2011) (Here, the lab analyst who performed the tests, and certified and signed the
blood alcohol concentration results, had been put on unpaid leave.) (same 4
dissenters as in Melendez-Diaz, #7 above) (Sotomayor, J., concurred in part,
stressing that the testifying expert “had no involvement whatsoever in the relevant
test and report,” and leaving for another day a case in which the witness “is a
supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited connection to
the scientific test at issue....”). See Malaska v. State, 213 Md. App. 492 (2014), p.
22 below. Be sure to see Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221(U.S. 2012), Norton,
and the Derr saga, pp. 23-24 below, for limitations on Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming.

Maryland Cases: Testimonial Hearsay
Statements To or By Agents of Police
(9)

Co-defendant’s statements made during proffer sessions for plea
bargaining. Butler v. State, 231 Md. App. 533 (2017) (reversible error in
denying defendant's motion for mistrial after detective used knowledge from
nontestifying co-defendant’s proffer statements to testify to meaning of recorded
jail conversations between the two defendants, e.g., “air holes” meant “gun”;
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limiting instruction to use only as to co-defendant who made statements did not
cure error).
(10) Statements of 8 and 10-year-old children in an interview by a social worker
working in tandem with and in presence of police officers, when child abuse
had been reported and the children had already accused defendant to the
police. Snowden v. State, 385 Md. 641 (2005) (Harrell, J.) (adopting test of
“whether the statements were made under circumstances that would lead an
objective declarant reasonably to believe that the statements would be
available for use later at trial”).
(11) Nontestifying codefendant’s written and taped statements to police at the
police station.
Codefendant had made a “miscellaneous agreement” functionally equivalent to a
guilty plea agreement that would become effective after defendant’s jury trial
(unless the codefendant made a successful motion for acquittal). Because the
codefendant had waived his right to actively participate in the trial, the trial court
should have treated his confession under Crawford, rather than simply under
Bruton. Morris v. State, 418 Md. 194 (2011) (Harrell, J.).
(12) Domestic violence assault victim’s excited statements to responding police,
where defendant was known to be sitting on steps outside victim’s apartment
and there were no apparent severe injuries requiring immediate medical
attention. State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307 (2009) (Adkins, J.).
(13) Brock v. State, 203 Md. App. 245 n.5 (2012) (D. Eyler, J.) (State conceded that
statements declarant made to police in months following stabbings were
testimonial).
Autopsy Reports
(14) See Malaska v. State, 216 Md. App. 492 (2014) (autopsy report was sufficiently
formalized to be testimonial, in part perforce, due to the medical examiner's
statutory obligations, but defendant’s right to confront was satisfied by
testimony of and ability to cross examine supervisor who was present during
the autopsy, reviewed the slides, and made the conclusion as to cause and
manner of death), cert. denied, 439 Md. 696 (2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
1162 (U.S. 2015). But as to lab reports attached to the autopsy report, see Reaves,
p. 24 below.
The first post-Crawford v. Washington analysis of this issue in Maryland
concluded that certain parts of autopsy reports, “Opinions, speculation and other
conclusions drawn [in autopsy reports] from the objective findings in autopsy
report,” were necessarily testimonial. Rollins v. State, 392 Md. 455 (2006)
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(Greene, J.). Accord Costley v. State, 175 Md. App. 90 (2007). But Rollins’s
rationale no longer holds. See p. 29 below.
Lab Results
(15) DNA and the Derr saga: Although no longer good law, Derr v. State, 422 Md.
211 (2011) (Greene, J.) (Derr I) held, relying on Bullcoming, p. 21 above, that the
Confrontation Clause demands that either the analyst who performed the test
leading to DNA results or a supervisor who observed it must testify at trial.
Derr I held inadmissible a testifying expert’s testimony relying in part on the
results of another’s 2002 DNA analysis, when she had supervised only the
subsequent “matching” 2004 DNA analysis. Derr I applied the same reasoning to
the results obtained by a serology examiner in 1985 regarding blood and semen at
the time of the charged rape.
Judge Harrell, joined by Judge Battaglia, concurred as to the testimony based on
the 2002 DNA analysis, but dissented as to the expert’s testimony relying on the
1985 serological results, which they found to be merely “raw data” and different
in several significant ways from the certificates in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming, p. 21 above.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held the opposite way to the
Derr I majority in United States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2011).
Derr I was vacated and remanded for reconsideration, 133 S. Ct. 63 (U.S. 2012),
in light of Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (U.S. 2012), where the plurality
had found no confrontation violation when DNA analysis by Cellmark of a
vaginal swab from the victim was relied on under the equivalent of Md. Rule
5-703 and compared by the testifying expert to her own analysis of the
defendant's blood sample. The reasoning was fractured: (1) four justices held that
the Cellmark analysis was not admitted for its truth, but for a nonhearsay purpose;
(2) four held, alternately, that the Cellmark report was nontestimonial, because its
authors lacked “the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of criminal
conduct,” 132 S. Ct. at 2242; and (3) five justices found that, in any event, the
Cellmark report was insufficiently solemn and formalized (unlike an affidavit,
deposition, or a formalized dialogue such as custodial interrogation) to be
testimonial, so that it was nontestimonial. See MD-EV 703:1 and 800:15.
On remand in Derr II, 434 Md. 88 (2013) (Greene, J.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2723 (U.S. 2014), the Court of Appeals, relying on the agreement of the five
Supreme Court justices in Williams, held that the DNA report was insufficiently
formal to be testimonial.
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Four days after its decision in Derr II, the Court of Appeals similarly held in
Cooper v. State, 434 Md. 209 (2013) (Greene, J.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2723
(U.S. 2014) (also holding that the trial court did not err either in concluding that
sufficient evidence of the chain of custody of the bodily fluid from the alleged
attacker had been shown, or in admitting the resulting DNA report as having been
shown to be trustworthy, reasonably relied upon by the testifying supervisor in
forming her opinion that the tested sample showed the DNA profile of – at that
point – an unidentified male, and necessary to illuminate her testimony; another
witness testified to having compared those results with the profile made from a
sample taken from the defendant by a buccal swab).
But the Maryland Court of Appeals subsequently held that a Forensic DNA
Case Report, comparing the DNA from a buccal swab of the defendant and the
laboratory’s analysis of DNA on a ski mask, and concluding “within a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty” that the defendant was a major
source of the saliva tested, was testimonial. State v. Norton, 443 Md. 517
(2015) (Battaglia, J.). Admitting the report without testimony of the analyst who
authored and signed it was reversible error. Testimony of the supervisor who had
“reviewed all the materials, all of the notes, the lab notes, all of the data that was
generated, the paperwork and the final report” did not satisfy the defendant's
confrontation right.
The Court of Appeals shifted its analysis from that which it had followed in
Derr II. The approach adopted in Norton is instead whether the report was
“created to accuse ‘a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct’.”
Applying this rule, from Justice Alito’s plurality opinion in Williams, the Norton
court concluded, would still lead to the result that the Derr reports were
nontestimonial, while the Norton report was testimonial. The Norton report
would also have been testimonial under Bullcoming, p. 21 above, so that the
defendant has the right to “cross-examine the responsible analyst.”
Bullcoming will apply when a report “includes the signatures of laboratory
officials, identifies the accused as the culprit in the underlying investigation,
conveys conclusory statements and certifies that proper procedures were followed
in reaching the ultimate conclusion.” Norton, 443 Md. at 553. Norton, at fn. 32,
distinguished from the case before it a Washington state case in which the
supervisor had testified, but the underlying draft report was not admitted into
evidence. That situation would seem to be more akin to Williams and Cooper.
The result in Cooper seems to remain correct, post-Norton.
Compare Reaves v. State, 2015 WL 6470501 (Md. App. 2015) (Zarnoch, J.)
(unreported) (in grandmother’s prosecution for child abuse resulting in death
caused by rubbing methadone on toddlers’ gums to help them sleep, toxicology
report was included in autopsy report, and relied on by medical examiner in
24

reaching her conclusion that cause of death was methadone intoxication;
toxicology report, although signed by two reviewers, contained no certification,
such as a representation as to the accuracy of the results, and was not sufficiently
formal or solemnized to be testimonial; if, however, the report were testimonial,
its author’s testimony satisfied defendant’s confrontation right; although she did
not conduct the tests, she reviewed the results and signed the report).
Statements to and by Medical Personnel
(16) Report prepared by SAFE nurse employed by the Sexual Assault Center at
Prince George’s Hospital, where victim had been taken by police officer (who
requested certain tests) after victim had been examined and bandaged at another
hospital; the 2nd hospital performed forensic tests and prescribed antibiotics;
report showed location of physical injuries observed by SAFE nurse. Green v.
State, 199 Md. App. 386 (2011).
Interpreters
(17) Taylor v. State, 226 Md. App. 317 (2016) (Arthur, J.) (reversible error to admit
interpreter's statements as to what deaf defendant was saying during police
interrogation, without providing defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the
interpreter).
N.b. The Confrontation Clause will not exclude, even if testimonial HS:
(1) The accused’s own statement, or another’s adopted by the accused
(see Md. Rule 5-803(a)(1)-(2)). Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004); Cox v. State, 421 Md. 630 (2011) (Greene, J.); or
(2) Dying declarations (see Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2)). Crawford n.6; Hailes v.
State, 442 Md. 488, 506-14 (2015) (for reasons of justice, dying declarations
were an exception to the confrontation right at common law that was not
intended to be abrogated by the Sixth Amendment).
II. HEARSAY IS NONTESTIMONIAL (AND THUS NOT REACHED BY THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE), see MD-EV 800:10 and 800:12—800:19, IF IT IS:
A.

U.S. Supreme Court Cases: Nontestimonial Hearsay
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Business records (generally) (see Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6)); or
“Casual remarks to an acquaintance” or overheard, off-the-cuff remarks; or
Statements by a coconspirator during and in furtherance of a conspiracy
(see Md. Rule 5-803(a)(5)); or
Statements made “unwittingly” to an informant or undercover officer.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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(5)

911 call where a declarant reasonably would conclude that operator, as agent
of police, “objectively” had “primary purpose” “to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis v. Washington, 554 U.S. 353 (2006).
Declarant-victim’s initial call in Davis was “plainly physical a call for help
against a bona fide physical threat”; victim’s responses were “frantic.”

(6)

Dictum in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), p. 21 above:
Merely routine records kept in the ordinary course of business, such as of
routine maintenance of equipment. E.g., United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660
F.3d 742 (4th Cir. 2011) (Treasury Enforcement Communications Systems
records of vehicles crossing into the United States and their license plates were
nontestimonial).

(7)

Dictum in Melendez-Diaz: Certificates of authentication of a pre-existing
official document.

(8)

Shooting victim’s statements in response to police’s questions, as victim lay
mortally wounded, outside a gas station, under all the pertinent
circumstances, showing primary purpose of resolving emergency. Michigan v.
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (over vehement dissent of Scalia and Ginsburg, JJ.).
Majority opinion by Justice Sotomayor held that whether statements are
testimonial is determined by a multi-factor analysis, and the presence or absence
of one factor is not dispositive.
The factors include (1) whether there seemed to be an ongoing emergency; (2)
the degree of formality of the interrogation; and (3) an objective evaluation
of the questions posed and answers given under all the circumstances in
which the declarant made the statements at issue.
As to factor (1), she noted that a deadly weapon had been used; the medical
condition of the victim (who had asked several times when medical help would
arrive); the shooter had not been located; and that the “zone of potential victims”
was broader than in a domestic violence case.
Seemingly veering away from Crawford’s historical reasoning and back toward
that of Ohio v. Roberts’ focus on reliability, Justice Sotomayor wrote: “implicit in
Davis is the idea that because the prospect of fabrication in statements given for
the primary purpose of resolving that emergency is presumed significantly
diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be
subject to the crucible of cross-examination.”

26

(9)

Cellmark report on DNA analysis. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (U.S.
2012) (plurality), p. 23 above. See MD-EV 800:15.

(10) Young child’s statements to his preschool teachers, identifying the defendant
as the person who had caused his injuries. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173
(2015) (Alito, J.) (“neither the child nor his teachers had the primary purpose of
assisting in [defendant]'s prosecution”) (Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas, JJ.,
concurred in the judgment). The teachers needed to ascertain whether it was safe
to return the child to his home environment, and whether other children might be
at risk. The Court noted “strong evidence that statements made in circumstances
similar to those facing [the child victim] were admissible at common law” and
thus it is “highly doubtful that statements like [the child’s] ever would have been
understood to raise Confrontation Clause concerns.” That the teachers were
required by Ohio law to report suspected child abuse to government authorities
did not convert that into the teachers’ primary mission. Moreover, “the fact that
the witness is unavailable because of a different rule of evidence [incompetency
due to youth, under Ohio law] does not change our analysis.”
The conviction was affirmed on remand, 2016 WL 2586638 (Ohio App. 2016) (no
error in admission of three-year-old’s statements under the Ohio “tender years”
hearsay exception, which required independent proof of abuse and analysis of
several factors as to whether the child was particularly likely to be telling the
truth). See MD-EV 800:19.
B.

Maryland Cases: Nontestimonial Hearsay
Statements to Police and Their Agents
(11) Dying declaration by victim, under facts similar to those in Michigan v. Bryant,
p. 26 above: a chaotic situation, and shooter’s whereabouts were unknown.
Head v. State, 171 Md. App. 642 (2006). The Court of Appeals has subsequently
held that the Confrontation Clause is inapplicable to all dying declarations. Hailes
v. State, 442 Md. 488 (2015). See p. 25 above.
(12) Domestic violence victim’s excited utterances, imploring defendant to stop,
heard by 911 operator over cell phone that had been left on during the assault.
Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 95 (2005) (Kenney, J.), cert. denied, 390 Md. 9
(2005).
(13) Domestic violence victim’s sobbing utterances in two 911 calls, requesting
police and an ambulance and describing defendant and his car (defendant hung
up phone the first time; the second time victim says he has left but she knows he
is coming back). Clark v. State, 188 Md. App. 110 (2009) (Alpert, J.).
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(14) 911 call reporting license tag numbers and color of car in which shooter had
just fled after leaving carry-out where shooting occurred; caller noted that she
was not summoning the police: they were already on the way. Langley v. State,
421 Md. 560 (2011) (4 to 3 decision) (Harrell, J.) (majority relied on Bryant, p. 26
above; Bell, C.J., and Greene and Eldridge, JJ., dissented).
(15) Several excited utterances made by declarant while pacing back and forth, to
responding police officer’s questions; declarant had himself been stabbed,
while trying to prevent flight of assailant who had fatally stabbed declarant’s
friend at a crowded tavern. When officer arrived, both victims were bleeding, and
assailant’s whereabouts were unknown. Officer called for medical assistance
twice, and testified it took the police about 30 minutes to secure the tavern and
make sure the suspect was not still there. Weapon was a knife. Not a domestic
violence case.
“Viewed objectively, the total circumstances…make clear that ‘the primary
purpose’ of the officer’s questioning…was to meet an ongoing emergency.”
Brock v. State, 203 Md. App. 245 (2012) (D. Eyler, J.).
(16) Certain DNA reports. Derr II, 434 Md. 88 (2013), p. 24 above.
Statements to Medical Personnel (see MD-EV 800:14)
(17) Statements by injured child to nurse examining him when admitting him to
pediatric ward, describing who had harmed him, even though child had been
brought to emergency room by police, who were questioning defendant. Griner
v. State, 168 Md. App. 714 (2006) (Salmon, J.).
Casual Remarks
(18) State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 714-18 (2014) (wiretapped conversations between
defendant and cohorts triggered neither Crawford nor Bruton, but nonetheless,
severance of retrials should be considered);
Casual remarks made by one inmate to another, describing the alleged crime.
Cox v. State, 421 Md. 630 (2011) (Greene, J.) (noting similarity of facts to those
of Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, (1970)). See Cox, 421 Md. at 650. Cox:
“We hold that when the State seeks to introduce an out-of-court statement against
a criminal defendant, the proper inquiry under Crawford and Bryant [p. 26 above]
is to determine whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s situation would
have made the statement ‘with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court
substitute for trial testimony.’ Bryant, 562 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.”
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Parts of Autopsy Reports
(19) In its earliest post-Crawford ruling on this subject, the Court of Appeals strained
to hold,“[R]outine, descriptive and not analytical, [but] objectively
ascertained and generally reliable facts” in autopsy reports are
nontestimonial; the recording of them is required by Md. Code Ann., Health Gen.
§ 5-311. Rollins v. State, 392 Md. 455 (2006).
The rationale of Rollins was implicitly overruled by Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming. See Derr I, p. 23 above; Green v. State, 199 Md. App. 386, 403-04
(2011). See MD-EV 800:15 at notes 127-60 and accompanying text.
In Malaska v. State, 216 Md. App. 492 (2014) (Kehoe, J.), p. 23 above, the Court
of Special Appeals, relying on Williams and Derr II, pp. 23-24 above, held that
the victim’s autopsy report, complying with Maryland statutes and signed by three
physicians, was testimonial, but that the medical examiner's supervisor’s
testimony, subject to cross-examination by the defendant, satisfied his
confrontation right, so that the autopsy report was properly admitted into
evidence. The supervisor testified that he was present during the dissection,
reviewed all the slides, and made the ultimate determination as to the cause and
manner of death.
Statements by Coconspirators During and in Furtherance of Conspiracy
(20) State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680 (2013) (insufficient evidence that Payne had
distinctly and explicitly agreed to other coconspirators’ pact to conceal the
underlying murder).
Chart 5 DID THE ACCUSED “FORFEIT” HIS OR HER CONFRONTATION RIGHT?
Contrast with this doctrine of “forfeiture by wrongdoing” the related question of a defendant’s
waiver of face-to-face confrontation by, e.g., being disruptive in the courtroom, Cousins v. State,
231 Md. App. 417 (2017) (having discharged counsel though court had found no reason to do so,
defendant announced intention to disrupt proceedings and embarked on profane rant against
judge; defendant was ordered from the courtroom and refused numerous opportunities to reenter,
if he agreed to behave civilly; there was no requirement to contemporaneously record the
proceedings so that the defendant could see or hear them); Shiflett v. State, 229 Md. App. 645
(2016) (defendant refused to comply with judge’s order to wear stun cuff, which judge had
determined was required for courtroom security); In re D.M., 228 Md. App. 451 (2016) (Sharer,
J.) (same presumption against shackling applies in juvenile proceedings as in adult criminal
courts; “[W]e hold that juveniles should not be shackled while appearing at juvenile court
hearings, unless and until there has been a finding on the record that the juvenile poses a security
concern or threat that would disrupt those particular proceedings or involve danger to the
juvenile or others.”).
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Is the out-of-court Declarant unavailable to
testify now?

No: no forfeiture.

Yes

Did “wrongdoing” cause that unavailability?

No: no forfeiture.

Yes

Did the Accused commit (participate in, authorize or
conspire to do)No;forfeiture.
the wrongdoing?

No: no forfeiture.

Yes

Did the Accused do that with the intention to prevent
the Declarant from testifying?

No: no forfeiture.

Yes

The Defendant has lost the right to confront the
Declarant and cannot complain about the admission
of the Declarant’s testimonial OCS’s.

Authority: Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). N.b. not only dicta in majority opinion
(Scalia, J.) but also the partial concurrence (Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.) and the dissent (Breyer,
Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ.) leave the door open for finding such intent upon proof of an intent to
“isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities.” See MD-EV 800:9.
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Chart 6 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
A.

Multiple Hearsay: OCS’S Within OCS’s : Md. Rule 5-805
When offered evidence contains OCS’s by more than one declarant, each OCS must be
evaluated independently.
Moreover, if there is more than one “level” of evidence, i.e., we are asked to rely on
one OCS to prove another OCS made earlier (as is often the case with medical records
or social workers’ reports), then we can’t get to the earlier OCS unless the more recent
one is admissible (either as nonhearsay or hearsay falling within a hearsay exception).
See Handy v. State, p. 17 above; Cooley v. State, 157 Md. App. 101 (2004) (one level
of OCS was nonhearsay and the other was hearsay falling within an exception), rev’d
on other grounds, 385 Md. 165 (2005); State v. Jones, 138 Md. App. 178 (2001)
(Hollander, J.). See MD-EV 805:1-805:2.

B.

Hearsay Exceptions that Are Applicable Only if the Declarant Testifies at Trial and is
Subject to Cross-Examination: Md. Rule 5-802.1
N.b: The hearsay may be proved by the testimony either of the declarant or of someone
other than the declarant, as long as the prerequisites of the Rule are met.
1.

Md. Rule 5-802.1(a): A subcategory of a testifying witness’s prior
inconsistent statements (“Nance statements”). See MD-EV 801(2):1.
The required foundation:
a.

The witness-declarant must testify at trial and be subject to crossexamination concerning the statement; and

b.

If this requirement is met, then Md. Rule 5-802.1(a) permits substantive use
of a witness’s prior inconsistent statements if they are either:
(1)
(2)
(3)

written and signed; or
stenographically or electronically recorded; or
made under oath at deposition, trial, or in a hearing or another
proceeding, including a grand jury proceeding.

E.g., Marlin v. State, 192 Md. App. 134, 144-47 (2010) (Hollander, J.)
(recanting witness’s prior inconsistent, audio-recorded statement to police
was properly admitted), cert. denied, 415 Md. 339 (2011).
2.

Md. Rule 5-802.1(b): A Subcategory of a Testifying Witness’s Prior
Consistent Statements. See MD-EV 801(2):1 and 801(2):3.
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The required foundation:
a.

The witness-declarant must testify at trial and be “subject to crossexamination concerning the statement”;

b.

The prior statement by the witness-declarant must be consistent with his or
her testimony at trial;

c.

The prior statement must be “offered to rebut an expressed or implied
charge against the declarant of fabrication, or improper influence or
motive;” and

d.

The prior statement must precede the alleged improper influence or motive
in order to be admissible as substantive evidence under Md. Rule 5802.1(b). Holmes v. State, 350 Md. 412, 712 A.2d 554 (1998) (Chasanow,
J.); Thomas v. State, 202 Md. App. 386 (2011) (Raker, J.) (motive to lie
arose as soon as witness knew he was under investigation and/or stopped by
police).
But Acker v. State, 219 Md. App. 210 (2014) (Kehoe, J.), cert. denied, 441
Md. 62 (2014), importantly held that “factually unsupported and conclusory
allegations of bias or fabrication,” including broad-brush “bald assertions
such as that the victim of alleged child sexual abuse was ‘starved for
attention’ and therefore is inherently unworthy of belief,” as well as an
allegation, unsupported by evidence, that the child was motivated to lie
because the defendant had rebuffed an advance by the child’s mother, do
not suffice to act as a bar to the admission of the declarant’s prior
consistent statements as substantive evidence, when those statements
predated a temporally-specific allegation of bias, regarding the defendant's
filing of a lawsuit against a family friend. (The court distinguished
Hajireen v. State, 203 Md. App. 537 (2012), cert. denied, 429 Md. 306
(2012), where only one theory of bias had been argued.)

3.

Md. Rule 5-802.1(c): The Witness’s Prior Identification of a Person (at a
Line-Up, etc.) See MD-EV 801(3):1—801(3):2.
E.g., Marlin v. State, 192 Md. App. 134, 144-47 (2010) (Hollander, J.) (finding
evidence of identification at photo array by recanting witness admissible), cert.
denied, 415 Md. 339 (2011).
N.b.: Due process issue arises only if state action has made the circumstances of
the identification unduly suggestive. In re D.M., 228 Md. App. 451 (2016) (no
error in master’s denial of defense motion to suppress identification, as “there
were sufficient indicia of reliability overall to support the court’s decision to
admit..., even were we to find that the show-up procedure utilized by the police
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rendered it impermissibly suggestive”); Wood v. State, 196 Md. App. 146, 151-63
(2010) (Moylan, J.), cert denied, 418 Md. 192 (2011). Accord Perry v. New
Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (U.S. 2012).
4.

Md. Rule 5-802.1(d): Prompt Report of Sexual Assault, Consistent with
Declarant’s Trial Testimony. See MD-EV 801(2):2.
Required foundation:
a.

Witness-declarant must testify at trial and be “subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement”;

b.

Prior statement must be consistent with the witness’s testimony at trial;

c.

Prior statement must have been a victim’s “prompt complaint of sexually
assaultive behavior.” See Choate v. State, 214 Md. App. 118, 143-49
(2013) (Moylan, J.), cert. denied, 436 Md. 328 (2013) victim's sister's
testimony to victim's prompt phone call to her, reporting rape, and
contextual statements, were properly admitted as substantive evidence;
there is no requirement that the defense have made an issue about the
promptness of any report);
Nelson v. State, 137 Md. App. 402 (2001) (Moylan, J.) (13-year old girl’s
statement to her 11-year-old sister, made shortly after defendant left their
apartment, that defendant had raped her, qualified for admission under Md.
Rule 5-802.1(d); victim’s statements a day later to her school counselor and
to a nurse-sexual assault examiner would likely also have qualified, but no
objections to them were preserved).

d.

These are admissible in both civil and criminal cases.
The Court of Appeals declined to address how much detail may be admitted
under this exception, and when, in Cooper v. State, 434 Md. 209, 236-37
(2013).

5.

Md. Rule 802.1(e): Recorded Recollection. See MD-EV 803(5):1—803(5):2.

6.

Child Abuse Cases
a.

“Tender years” exception, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Pro. § 11-304. See MDEV 803(27):1.
In a criminal proceeding or in a juvenile proceeding other than a CINA
proceeding, when this hearsay exception is relied upon, the child victim
must also testify at the proceeding.
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Compare Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015), p. 27 above (no violation
of confrontation clause to admit, under Ohio’s “tender years” hearsay
exception, nontestimonial statements of three-year old child abuse victim to
his preschool teachers as to who caused his injuries, when child was
incompetent to testify under Ohio law).
See In re J.J., 231 Md. App. 304 (2016) (Graeff, J.) (no clear error in
juvenile court’s factual findings, nor error on law in ruling, after hearing
social worker testify to nine-year old child’s statements to her, in E.R.
treatment room, regarding sexual abuse by father, and listening to the audiorecorded interview, and considering – on the record – all thirteen 11-304
factors, that child’s statements in question were reliable and admissible; due
to availability of recording, no requirement to have child testify as to
admissibility under this statute; child’s competency as a witness was not
relevant to 11-304 determination, nor were DNA results, nor questions that
went merely to impeachment of child's credibility, rather than to 11-304
factors).
Evidence included (1) that J.J. said her father had rubbed his “wee-wee” on
her “private part” and had made her “suck his wee-wee”; (2) that J.J.
indicated with her hands the length and width of the penis; (3) had then
drawn a picture of it; and, (4) in answer to a question as to “what happens
when you have to suck someone’s wee-wee,” performed an act with a pen.
Under these facts, were all of these “statements” by the child? Were they all
offered for TOMA?
2017 General Assembly: House Bill 483, which passed the House and was
heard in the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on March 28, 2017,
would have amended 11-304 by adding to subsection (c) an alternative to
admissibility for a statement other than one made to a person in one of the
listed professions or occupations. The amendment reads:
or (2) The statement: (i) describes the charged offense; (ii) was made
to the first adult other than the defendant to whom the child victim made a
statement about the offense; (iii) was promptly reported in accordance with
section 5-704 or section 5-705 of the Family Law Article; and (iv) was
documented in writing or by audio or video recording.
If this bill had passed, it will provide a route of admissibility for important
evidence that need not comply with Md. Rule 5-802.1(d).
b.

Closed-circuit TV testimony, Md. Crim. Pro. Code Ann. § 11-303. See
MD-EV 803(26):1.
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c.

C.

Recent related case law: Bey v. State, (Md., Mar. 27, 2017) (in a
prosecution under Md. Code Ann., Crim. L. 3-315, continuing course of
conduct against a child, multiple convictions and sentences per victim are
precluded).

Md. Rule 5-803: Hearsay Exceptions Applicable No Matter Whether the Declarant
is Available or Unavailable to Testify at Trial, and No Matter Whether the
Declarant Testifies or Not
These OCS’s may be proved by the declarant’s own testimony to his or her OCS or by
the testimony of any other witness having first-hand knowledge of the OCS. See MDEV 803:1.
1.

Md. Rule 5-803(a), Statement by Party-Opponent: An opposing party’s own,
adopted, authorized, or agent’s statement, or an opposing party’s coconspirator’s
statement (often misleadingly referred to as an “admission of a party-opponent.”
See MD-EV 803(a):1 and 801(4):1—801(4):12.
a.

Any such statement offered by one party, against the opposing party
who made, adopted, etc. the statement will not be excluded by the
hearsay rule. See MD-EV 801(4):1.
If it is to be excluded, it will be due to some other rule. See, e.g., Smith v.
Delaware North Companies, 446 Md. 290 (2016) (Greene, J.) (reversible
error to admit, as evidence against the plaintiff-physician – here, by
impeaching her expert – a consent order entered into between the physician
and the Board of Physicians; admissibility is prohibited by Md. Code Ann.,
Health Occ. § 14-410, which applies to any type of action); Butler v. State,
231 Md. App. 533 (2017) (reversible error to admit defendant's statements
made during first proffer session, in which he had lied, when detectives told
him he had “started fresh” in second session).

b.

The phrase “admission against interest,” found in some case law, is a
misleading, mythological creature. Unlike under Md. Rule 5-804(b)(3)
(“declaration against interest” by a now unavailable declarant), under Md.
Rule 5-803(a) there is no requirement that the OCS of a party opponent
have been disserving to the declarant at the time it was made.

c.

Md. Rule 5-803(a)(1): Statement of party opponent by that party himself
or herself (See MD-EV 801(4):2 and 801(4):8)
See Oku v. State, 433 Md. 582 (2013) (Barbera, C.J.) (defendant’s
testimony in district court is admissible against him in a de novo trial in
circuit court).
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Flight Evidence: See State v. Shim, 418 Md. 37, 56-59 (2011) (Adkins, J.)
(error to have given “flight” instruction to jury when evidence showed only
that defendant left scene of crime and took various steps to avoid being
apprehended: these steps did not amount to “flight”).
Song Lyrics/Fiction: Hannah v. State, 420 Md. 339 (2011) (Murphy, J.)
held that the trial court had committed reversible error in permitting the
prosecutor to admit on cross-examination, after the alleged shooterdefendant had testified that he had no access to handguns and had never
held one, the defendant’s drawing of a gun and ten rap lyrics he had written
about guns and shootings.
The appellate court distinguished inadmissible works of fiction from
possibly admissible autobiographical statements of historical fact. It
found that the evidence in this case lacked the special relevance needed to
make it admissible under Md. Rule 5-404(b), and amounted to mere
propensity evidence as to violence. The door had not been opened by
defendant’s direct examination.
d.

Md. Rule 5-803(a)(2): Adoptive Statements (See MD-EV 801(4):3 and
801(4):(9))
(i)

Defendant adopted alleged coconspirator’s statements to a fellow
inmate by standing by and adding details. Cox v. State, 194 Md.
App. 629 (2010) (Graeff, J.) (affirming J. Watts), aff’d, 421 Md. 630
(2011) (Greene, J.) (Court of Appeals did not reach this issue: see 421
Md. at 641 n.4).

(ii)

State’s plea agreement with a witness that the witness would testify
truthfully did not make that witness’s actual testimony at the trial of a
likely codefendant admissible as an adoptive admission by the State in
the subsequent trial of the defendant. Defense was permitted to call
witness, but not to prove plea agreement. Armstead v. State, 195 Md.
App. 599 (2010) (Kenney, J.), cert. denied, 418 Md. 191 (2011).

(iii) Tacit Admissions: A person’s silence in the face of another’s
statement can be interpreted as acquiescence in the truth of (adoption
by silence of) the other’s statement when three conditions are met:
(1)

The party-opponent (or party’s agent, etc.) heard the other’s
statement;

(2)

The circumstances allowed for the party-opponent (or agent, etc.)
to reply; and
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(3)

Under the circumstances, ordinarily a person similarly situated
who was in disagreement would “speak up” and correct the
speaker.

These preliminary facts regarding tacit admissions (and other adoptive
admissions also addressed by Md. Rule 5-803(a)(2)) fall under Md.
Rule 5-104(b). If a reasonable jury could find them to be met, the
judge should admit the evidence (subject to Md. Rule 5-403).
e.

Statements Authorized by a Party-Opponent (see MD-EV 801(4):4 and
801(4):10)

f.

Statements by a Party-Opponent’s Coconspirator During and in
Furtherance of the Conspiracy (see MD-EV 801(5):1—801(5):2)
See, e.g., State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680 (2014); Ross v. State (Md. App. Mar.
3, 2017) (J. Moylan) (text message from one coconspirator to another, that
defendant was “moving too fast,” put defendant in conspiracy; in any event,
evidence was admitted without objection).

2.

Md. Rule 5-803(b): Other Exceptions that Apply Whether or Not the
Declarant Testifies at Trial or is Available or Unavailable to Testify
a.

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(1), Present sense impressions: a very small window of
time. See MD-EV 803(1):1—803(1):2.
Foundation elements:

b.

(i)

The OCS was made while the declarant was perceiving the event, or
immediately afterwards; and

(ii)

The OCS merely describes or explains the event.

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(2), Excited utterances: a bigger window, as long as
the declarant was still so upset by the event that s/he was not thinking
before speaking, so as to be able to fabricate a self-serving statement.
See MD-EV 803(2):1—803(2):2.
Foundation elements:
(i)

a startling event occurred;

(ii)

OCS was made while the declarant remained under such stress
that s/he could not stop to think (and thus to fabricate a selfserving statement) (look at all the relevant circumstances, including
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declarant’s emotional state, the time lapse between the startling event
and the OCS, and whether leading questions were asked); and
(iii) The OCS relates to the starting event.
Witness, such as the declarant herself or another who heard the OCS, such
as a police officer, must lay foundation: describe affect of declarant; time
lapse; questions asked, if any; other evidence of startling event, injuries, etc.
See Cooper v. State, 434 Md. 237-45 (2013) (rape victim's statements to
roommate and police detective were properly admitted).
c.

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(3), Statements by declarant as to his or her present
state of mind or physical condition: nonhearsay if not offered for TOMA,
but admissible hearsay under Md. Rule 5-803(b)(3) if offered for TOMA of
the declarant’s asserted state of mind, rather than to prove the truth of a fact
that had led to the declarant’s state of mind. Shepard v. United States, 290
U.S. 96 (1933). See MD-EV 803(3):2 and 803(3):4 (physical condition);
803(3):1 and 803(3):3 (state of mind).

Rule 5-803(b)(3) Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition
A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or
physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
health), offered to prove the declarant’s then existing condition or the declarant’s future
action, but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered
or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of
declarant’s will.
Declarant’s OCS as to his/her state of mind existing at time of OCS is:
(i)

Admissible to show declarant’s state of mind, when relevant. See
Edery v. Edery, 193 Md. App. 215 (2010) (Meredith, J.) (decedent’s
statements that she wanted to be buried in Israel were improperly
excluded when offered to show her wishes).
Ex. Victim’s statements of her fear of the defendant, made before her
murder, and a domestic violence protective order that prohibited the
defendant from entering the victim’s home, were admissible as
relevant to defense raised that victim had invited defendant into her
home, and gun went off accidentally. Case v. State, 188 Md. App. 279
(1997) (Murphy, J.).

(ii)

Admissible to show declarant’s subsequent action, after the
statement, in accordance with stated intent. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
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Ex. “I’m going to skip school tomorrow,” admissible to show
declarant played hooky the next day.
See Figgins v. Cochrane, 174 Md. App. 1, 27-31 (2007) (Moylan, J.)
(Hillmon analysis inapplicable when no contention that declarant
subsequently acted in accord with stated intent), aff’d, 430 Md. 392
(2008).
In Smith v. State, 423 Md. 573 (2011) (Rodowsky, J.) where the
critical issue was whether the defendant had shot the victim or the
victim had committed suicide, it was reversible error to admit State’s
evidence tending to show that the victim was not depressed, but to
exclude testimony of a trooper – who had arrested the victim for DWI
one month before the victim’s death – that the victim appeared to be
depressed, stressed about the situation, and that the victim said to
trooper, “This is the last thing I need in my life right now on top of all
the…other shit going on in my life.”
The Court of Appeals did not analyze whether the OCS was offered
for TOMA. The OCS could have been relevant just to show that was
how the victim felt, not that a lot really was going on in the victim’s
life, in which case it would have been admissible as nonhearsay; but in
either case it was admissible.
(iii) But inadmissible (under this hearsay exception only) to show
something that occurred prior to the statement, that caused declarant
to have the particular state of mind. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S.
96 (1933).
Ex. “I hate Phil because he hits me and breaks my toys.” Admissible to
show that declarant hates/dislikes Phil, if that is relevant to the case;
inadmissible, if offered under Md. Rule 5-803(b)(3), to show that Phil
has hit the declarant.
d.

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4), Statement of past or present facts, made while
seeking medical treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of
possibletreatment. See MD-EV 803(4):1—803(4):2.
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Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or
Treatment
Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in
contemplation of treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or
external sources thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in
contemplation of treatment.
Required foundation:
(i)

OCS made by person seeking medical treatment, should medical
treatment become necessary; and

(ii)

Declarant knew that OCS would be relied on for possible treatment.
(This is the circumstantial guarantee of sincerity.)
If a patient is a child, it is particularly important that the doctor or
nurse explains to the patient (or other declarant, e.g., parent) that
what is said by the declarant will determine treatment. See State v.
Coates, 405 Md. 131 (2008) (Greene, J.) (reversible error to admit
evidence); Low v. State, 119 Md. 413 (1998) (Thieme and Byrnes, JJ.).

(iii) Only the facts related in the OCS that are reasonably pertinent to
medical treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment will be
properly admissible.
Query: Can the identification of the person who causes injuries ever
be pertinent to medical treatment and thus admissible under Md. Rule
5-803(b)(4)?
Yes, e.g., to identify poison given, and thus the proper antidote. If
child abuse, “not ordinarily.” State v. Coates, 405 Md. 131 (2008)
(Greene, J.), aff’g 175 Md. App. 588 (2002) (Hollander, J.) (it was
known at time of OCS that child no longer had any contact with its
perpetrator). But see In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 33-36 (1988)
(R. Bell, J.) (yes, due to possible testing for sexually transmitted
disease; possible removal from home).
A number of federal cases hold that relevance to psychological
treatment, because of abuse, is sufficient.
e.

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6), Business records (see MD-EV 803(6):1—803(6):2)
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f.

Absence of entries in business records (see MD-EV 803(7):1—803(7):2)

g.

Public (governmental agent is the declarant) records and reports (see
MD-EV 803(8):1—803(8):2)
Note that a new subsection, Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A)(iv,) was added by
Rules Order of September 17, 2015, creating a hearsay exception, in a final
protective order hearing, for factual findings made by the Department
of Social Services, regarding abuse of a child or vulnerable adult,
reported to the court pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 4-505. A
Committee note adds that a continuance may be granted if necessary to
provide the parties a fair opportunity to review the report and prepare for
the hearing, including an opportunity to subpoena the author. The amended
Rule applies to all actions commenced on or after January 1, 2016 and,
insofar as practicable, to all actions then pending.
Because of body cameras now used by police, an amendment was needed
to Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8), as subsection (C) generally precludes the
admission against an accused of records of matters observed by law
enforcement. New subsection (D) provides for the admissibility of such
camera recordings (subject to Md. Rule 5-805, re: multiple hearsay), if
properly authenticated, made contemporaneously with the matter recorded,
and circumstances do not indicate lack of trustworthiness.

h.

Records of vital statistics (birth, death) (see MD-EV 803(9):1—803(9):2)

i.

Absence of public record or entry (see MD-EV 803(10):1—803(10):2)

j.

Records of churches and other religious organizations (see MD-EV
803(11):1—803(11):2)

k.

Certificates of marriage, baptism, etc. (see MD-EV 803(12):1—
803(12):2)

l.

Family records (see MD-EV 803(13):1—803(13):2)

m.

Records of documents (rather than the documents themselves) affecting an
interest in property (see MD-EV 803(14):1—803(14):2)

n.

Statements in documents affecting an interest in property (see MD-EV
803(15):1—803(15):2)

o.

Ancient documents (more than 30 years old; new controversy in the works,
as computer documents reach that age) (see MD-EV 803(16):1—803(16):2)
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p.

Market reports and commercial publications (see MD-EV 803(17):1—
803(17):2)

q.

Learned treatises (nascent case law with regard to Internet sources) (see
MD-EV 803(18):1—803(18):2)

r.

Reputation concerning personal or family history (see MD-EV
803(19):1—803(19):2)

s.

Reputation concerning boundaries or general history (see MD-EV
803(20):1—803(20):2)

t.

Reputation as to character (see MD-EV 803(21):1—803(21):2)

u.

Judgment of previous conviction: see Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10912 (see MD-EV 803(22):1)

v.

Judgment as to personal or family history, general history, or
boundaries (see MD-EV 803(23):1—803(23):2)

w.

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(24), the “catch-all” exception (see MD-EV 803(24):1–
803(24):2 and 807:1—807:2)
Brock v. State, 203 Md. App. 245 (2012) (D. Eyler, J.) (trial court properly
excluded unavailable declarant’s OCS, in which declarant recanted prior
statements identifying defendant to police, when offered by defense for
TOMA; finding also that defense barely preserved the issue of whether the
OCS was admissible to impeach the declarant under Md. Rule 5-806, the
court held that exclusion of the OCS was harmless error, in light of the
other evidence in the case, where the OCS offered by State did not directly
identify defendant).

D.

Hearsay Exceptions Applicable Only When the Declarant is Shown, under Md. Rule
5-804(a), to be Unavailable to Testify (see MD-EV 804:1—804:2)
As to one of the possible bases for unavailability, the declarant's “then existing physical
or mental illness or infirmity,” under Md. Rule 5-804(a)(4), see Vielot v. State, 225 Md.
App. 492, 498-504 (2015) (Reed, J.), cert. denied, 446 Md. 706 (2016) (no abuse of
discretion in finding that witness was unavailable to attend retrial when she had had
shoulder surgery that required extensive physical therapy and could not drive from New
Jersey to Maryland – State had offered witness’s disability certificate and a doctor's
note – and thus no error in admitting declarant's prior testimony, which otherwise
qualified under Md. Rule 5-804(b)(1)).
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1.

Md. Rule 5-804(b)(1), Prior testimony now offered against a party who had an
opportunity and similar motive to examine the declarant at the earlier
proceeding. See MD-EV 804(1):1—804(1):2.
In Williams v. State, 416 Md. 670 (2010) (Raker, J.), the State had violated its
discovery obligation under Md. Rule 4-263(d), when it had not disclosed
impeaching information known to a police officer that had come to light after the
first trial: that a key eyewitness had said she was “legally blind.” The eyewitness
died before the retrial.
The second trial judge admitted the witness’s videotaped testimony, along with
medical records about her vision and the detective’s testimony that she had told
him she was legally blind. The Court of Appeals’ majority found these steps an
inadequate substitute for the ability to cross-examine the eyewitness. It concluded
that: “On remand, if the State wishes to introduce portions of the previously
recorded testimony, the trial court should redact any portion which relates to what
she might have seen or testimony depending upon her vision.” Judge Murphy,
joined by Judge Rodowsky, dissented.

2.

Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2), Dying declarations. See MD-EV 804(2):1—804(2):2.
Hailes v. State, 442 Md. 488, 505-06 (2015) (statement made 2 years before death
qualified; “[W]e hold that the length of time between a statement and the
declarant's death is entitled to little, if any, weight in determining whether a
declarant believed that the declarant's death was imminent when the declarant
made the statement.”); Head v. State, 171 Md. App. 642 (2006).

3.

Md. Rule 5-804(b)(3), Statements against the unavailable declarant’s
pecuniary, proprietary, or penal interest. See MD-EV 804(3):1—804(3):2.

4.

Md. Rule 5-804(b)(4), Statements of personal or family history, such as
lineage. See MD-EV 804(4):1—804(4):2.

5.

The “forfeiture by wrongdoing” hearsay exceptions: Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5)
(civil); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-901 (certain criminal cases
only). See MD-EV 804(5):1.
Both rules restrict the types of statements potentially admissible to only
recorded or written and signed statements (the same types that are also
potentially substantively admissible prior inconsistent statements under Md. Rule
5-802.1(a), a rule that applies when the declarant testifies at trial). They also
impose a notice requirement on the party seeking to offer evidence under the
forfeiture exception.
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The criminal statute foregoes the usual preliminary fact standards of Md. Rule 5104(a) and imposes higher burdens: (1) proof “by clear and convincing evidence
that the party against whom the statement is offered engaged in, directed, or
conspired to commit the wrongdoing that procured the unavailability of the
declarant”; and (2) that the rules of evidence are “strictly applied” by the court in
making this determination.
The criminal statute applies only in trials for certain crimes (generally, crimes of
violence and drug crimes).
As to the concomitant forfeiture of the confrontation right, see Chart 5, pp. 29-30
above.
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